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Oliver Smith5c95bc92020-04-03 14:03:24 +02001= Specification for IMSI Pseudonymization on the Radio Interface for 2G and Above
2
3== Introduction
4
5A long-standing issue in the 3GPP specifications is, that mobile phones and
6other mobile equipment (ME) have to send the International Mobile Subscriber
7Identity (IMSI) unencrypted over the air. Each IMSI is uniquely identifying the
8person who bought the associated Subscriber Identity Module (SIM) used in the
9ME. Therefore most people can be uniquely identified by recording the IMSI that
10their ME is sending. Efforts are made in the 2G and above specifications to
11send the IMSI less often, and where possible use the Temporary Mobile
12Subscriber Identity (TMSI) instead.
13
14But this is not enough. So-called IMSI catchers were invented and are used to
15not only record IMSIs when they have to be sent. But also to force ME to send
16their IMSI by immitating a Base Transceiver Station (BTS). IMSI catchers have
17become small and affordable, even criminals actors without much budget can use
18them to track anybody with a mobile phone.
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20The solution presented in this document is to periodically change the IMSI of
21the ME to a new pseudonymous IMSI allocated by the Home Location Register (HLR)
22or Home Subscriber Service (HSS). The only component that needs to be changed
23in the network besides the SIM is the HLR/HSS, therefore it should be possible
24for a Mobile Virtual Network Operator (MVNO) to deploy this privacy
25enhancement.
26
27== Location Update
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29=== Regular
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31=== With Pseudonymous IMSI
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33== Implementation Notes
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35=== Source Code for Reference Implementation
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37=== Warning the User if the IMSI Does Not Change
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39=== End to End Encryption of SMS
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41=== User-configurable Minimum Duration Between IMSI Changes