Start to use struct osmo_auth_vector from gsm_auth_tuple
Rather than having a 'private' structure for kc, sres and rand, we
now finally (with 4 years delay) use osmo_auth_vector from libosmogsm,
which encapsulates authentication vectors that can be either GSM
triplets or UMTS quintuples or a combination of both.
gsm_auth_tuple becomes a wrapper around osmo_auth_vector, adding
use_count and key_seq to it.
key_seq is no longer initialized inside gprs_gsup_messages.c, as there
is no CKSN / key_seq inside the message anyway. If a usre of the code
needs key_seq, they need to manage it themselves.
diff --git a/openbsc/src/gprs/sgsn_vty.c b/openbsc/src/gprs/sgsn_vty.c
index 3f61163..50f0e8f 100644
--- a/openbsc/src/gprs/sgsn_vty.c
+++ b/openbsc/src/gprs/sgsn_vty.c
@@ -613,11 +613,11 @@
vty_out(vty, " seq # : %d, ",
at->key_seq);
vty_out(vty, " RAND : %s, ",
- osmo_hexdump(at->rand, sizeof(at->rand)));
+ osmo_hexdump(at->vec.rand, sizeof(at->vec.rand)));
vty_out(vty, " SRES : %s, ",
- osmo_hexdump(at->sres, sizeof(at->sres)));
+ osmo_hexdump(at->vec.sres, sizeof(at->vec.sres)));
vty_out(vty, " Kc : %s%s",
- osmo_hexdump(at->kc, sizeof(at->kc)),
+ osmo_hexdump(at->vec.kc, sizeof(at->vec.kc)),
VTY_NEWLINE);
}
@@ -704,17 +704,17 @@
OSMO_ASSERT(subscr->sgsn_data);
- if (osmo_hexparse(sres_str, &at.sres[0], sizeof(at.sres)) < 0) {
+ if (osmo_hexparse(sres_str, &at.vec.sres[0], sizeof(at.vec.sres)) < 0) {
vty_out(vty, "%% invalid SRES value '%s'%s",
sres_str, VTY_NEWLINE);
goto failed;
}
- if (osmo_hexparse(rand_str, &at.rand[0], sizeof(at.rand)) < 0) {
+ if (osmo_hexparse(rand_str, &at.vec.rand[0], sizeof(at.vec.rand)) < 0) {
vty_out(vty, "%% invalid RAND value '%s'%s",
rand_str, VTY_NEWLINE);
goto failed;
}
- if (osmo_hexparse(kc_str, &at.kc[0], sizeof(at.kc)) < 0) {
+ if (osmo_hexparse(kc_str, &at.vec.kc[0], sizeof(at.vec.kc)) < 0) {
vty_out(vty, "%% invalid Kc value '%s'%s",
kc_str, VTY_NEWLINE);
goto failed;